Necessary truths, evidence, and knowledge. by Logins, Artūrs
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC 
BY 4.0), which permits reproduction, adaptation, and distribution provided the original author and source are credited.
ABSTRACT
According to the knowledge view of evidence notoriously defended by Timothy Williamson 
(2000), for any subject, her evidence consists of all and only her propositional knowledge 
(E=K). Many have found (E=K) implausible. However, few have offered arguments against 
Williamson’s positive case for (E=K). In this paper, I propose an argument against William-
son’s positive case in favour of (E=K). Central to my argument is the possibility of the knowl-
edge of necessary truths. I also draw some more general conclusions concerning theorizing 
about evidence.
Keywords: functions of evidence, E=K, evidential probability, probability raising.
Introduction
One of the revolutionary theses of Williamson’s Knowledge and Its Limits (2000) is that, for 
any subject, her evidence consists of all and only her propositional knowledge (E=K). E=K can 
be seen as flagship of the positive part of the knowledge-first program in epistemology: not only 
can knowledge not be analysed in more fundamental terms (the negative part), it can also be suc-
cessfully used in chara erising other epistemologically interesting notions, such as evidence, for 
instance. E=K is constituted of two theses: E→K and K→E. In defence of the latter Williamson 
has proposed that it is pre-theoretically intuitive and that possible arguments against it do not 
succeed. His main argument for E→K appeals to our ordinary concept of evidence, and to consid-
erations about what kind of entities can fulfil the central functions of that concept. According to 
Williamson, the central functions of our ordinary concept of evidence are figuring in inferences 
to the best explanation, playing a role in probabilistic reasoning, and enabling one to rule out 
inconsistent hypotheses (inconsistent with it). He argues that only known propositions can play 
the central role of our ordinary concept of evidence.
A striking feature of the Williamsonian knowledge-first approach is its aspiration for theo-
retical fruitfulness and economy. This is most remarkably illustrated in Williamson’s treatment 
of evidence and evidential probability. Given the thesis that evidence is knowledge, and some 
minimal assumptions about mathematics of probability and constraints on evidential support, 
Williamson is in a position to propose a powerful model of evidential probability that rivals tradi-
tional subjective Bayesian approaches. Now, the better a model fares with re ect to its explana-
tory capacities, the more it will be insensitive to particular descriptive details. This seems to affect 
E=K and knowledge-based accounts of evidential probability as well. Williamson is clear about 
this; and when discussing, for instance, his understanding of the probability function, he recog-
nizes that while his assumptions about the mathematics of probabilities (e.g. the probability axi-
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oms) entail that logically equivalent propositions will receive 
same probability on given evidence, this should be considered 
a price to be paid for the greater clarity and explanatory pow-
er. This sort of stance in preferring simplicity and explanatory 
power to capturing all the particularities of explananda seems 
to be a general trait of Williamson’s epistemology.
On the other hand, however, Williamson is also attached 
to chara erizing our ordinary concepts. This is true in partic-
ular in Williamson’s treatment of the concept of evidence (and 
evidence property). His argument for E=K, as we have already 
noticed, depends crucially on considerations about the ordi-
nary usage of the concept of evidence. These two a ects of 
Williamson’s approach stand in tension. Some a ects of this 
sort of tension in Williamson’s epistemology, namely between 
his aspiration for mathematical clarity and in particular his 
aspiration to maintain a version of Bayesianism in theorizing 
about evidence and his reliance on the ordinary usage of con-
cepts and intuitive judgements, have been already noticed in 
the literature. For instance, Dunn (2014) sheds light on the 
tension between Williamson’s Bayesian commitments and 
his view that we can gain evidence through inductive infer-
ences. In what follows I aim to bring light to another place 
where this sort of tension surfaces. The problem is not the 
tension itself, but rather its impact on Williamson’s positive 
case in favour of E=K. In short, unless Williamson is ready 
to give up crucial bits of his formal approach, which, I believe, 
he will not do, his main argument in favour of E=K cannot be 
taken to support E=K. This is not to undermine E=K or the 
knowledge-first approach in general. Rather, this is to claim 
that there is no easy way of providing arguments for a simple 
theoretical model that are based on the use of ordinary con-
cept of evidence.
Argument from the Knowledge 
of Necessary Truths
Unsurprisingly, over the last fifteen years E=K has re-
ceived sustained attention. Many philosophers have found it 
implausible.2 However, few have attempted to undermine the 
positive case (allegedly) supporting Williamson’s thesis (re-
cent exceptions include Hughes, 2014; Goldman, 2009). In 
this paper, I present an argument against Williamson’s posi-
tive case in favour of (E=K). Central to my argument is the 
possibility of the knowledge of necessary truths. The point of 
this discussion is only to show that the existence of known 
necessary truths raises more trouble for (E=K) than one may 
have expected.
In order to consider how knowledge of necessary truths 
raises a problem for Williamson’s positive case for (E=K), let 
us first focus on the following argument:
 (1) (E=K) For any subject S, S’s evidence is all and only 
the propositions that S knows.
 (2) (Functionality of Evidence FOE) For any subject 
S, for any proposition e. If e is part of S’s evidence then e 
is evidence for some hypothesis h.
 (3) (Probabilism) Prior (unconditional) probability 
of necessary truths is 1 (P(p)=1, where p is a necessary 
truth) (Kolmogorov’s 2nd axiom).
 (4) (Known Necessary Truths KNT) For some subject 
S, and some necessary truth p, S knows p (e.g. 2+2=4).
(5) p (e.g. 2+2=4) is part of S’s evidence. (1, 4)
(6) p (e.g. 2+2=4) is evidence for a hypothesis h. (2, 5)
 (7) (EV) For any subject S, for any proposition e, and for 
any hypothesis h, e is evidence for h for S if and only if e 
is part of S’s evidence and the probability of h given e is 
higher than the probability of h alone (i.e. P(h|e)>P(h), 
given that P(h)≠ 0).3
(8) P(2+2=4) < 1 [6, 7]
(9) P(2+2=4) = 1 [3]
(1)–(9) lead to a contradiction; in order to avoid incon-
sistency one has to reject either (1), (2), (3), (4), or (7).
A crucial step in the argument is the inference from 
(6) and (7) to (8). The inference is valid. (EV) entails that 
P(e) cannot be 1 (where e is evidence for h for S). As Wil-
liamson puts it: “For if P(h| e) > P(h), then P(e) is neither 0 
(otherwise P(h| e) is ill defined) nor 1 (otherwise P(h| e) = 
P(h))” (Williamson (2000, p. 187)). The following shows 
why P(h|e)=P(h) when P(e)=1. Start with the definition of 
the conditional probability: P(h|e)=P(e&h)/P(e). Suppose 
that P(e)=1. P(h|e)=P(e&h)/1=P(e&h). Now, P(h)=P(h&e) 
+ P(h&not-e). If P(e)=1, then P(h&not-e)=0. We have sup-
posed that P(e)=1. Hence, P(h)=P(h&e). Remember that if 
P(e)=1, then P(h|e)=P(e&h). Therefore, P(h|e)=P(h). Hence, 
P(e) has to be less than 1 if (EV) holds. Now, (6) tells us that 
P(e) in our case is P(2+2=4). Hence, we have to infer that 
P(2+2=4) is less than 1.4
Williamson (2000) is committed, on pain of inconsisten-
cy, to the rejection of (2), for he is explicitly committed to (1), 
(3), (4), and (7).5 What is more, rejecting (3) entails a large 
2 Here is a non exhaustive list of more or less radical critics of (E=K): Harman (2002), Joyce (2004), Silins (2005), Brueckner (2005), 
Hawthorne (2005), Dodd (2007), Whitcomb (2008), Neta (2008), Kelly (2008), Conee and Feldman (2008), Goldman (2009), Schiffer 
(2009), Comesana and Kantin (2010), Schroeder (2011), Rizzieri (2011), Littlejohn (2012), Logins (2013), Hughes (2013), Arnold (2013), 
Dougherty and Rysiew (2013), Dunn (2014), McGlynn (2014) and Mitova (2014).
3 See Williamson’s original formulation: “EV e is evidence for h for S if and only if S’s evidence includes e and P(h|e) > P(h)” (Williamson, 2000, p. 187).
4 Thanks to Julien Dutant and an anonymous referee here.
5 One could also argue that a proponent of E=K may rather revise the EV principle (premise 7) in order to avoid the inconsistency. For 
one thing, Williamson himself seems to be open to potential revisions of EV: “At least as a first approximation, we can model the first 
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cost: one loses the important mathematical power of probabi-
lism. By rejecting (4), one relinquishes a highly plausible view 
and by the same token concedes a lot to the sceptic, whereas by 
giving up (7), one forfeits simplicity and fruitfulness in theoris-
ing about evidence and evidential support in terms of probabil-
ity. Of course, endorsing the claim that something can be part 
of one’s evidence set and yet not be evidence for any hypothesis 
is something of an oddity. However, on balance, it might appear 
to be the “lesser evil” in the present dialectical situation. Let me 
stress again that Williamson is committed to (1), (3), (4), and 
(7), and even if he were to revise his commitments the pros-
pects for a reasonable rejection of one of these looks very bleak. 
We have to reject (2) given the extremely high plausibility of 
(3), (4), and (7) if we also want to maintain E=K.6
Furthermore, one might think that the rejection of (2) 
can also be motivated on independent grounds, for it is pos-
sible to distinguish between the following two concepts: evi-
dence-for-a-hypothesis (evidence-for-h) and subject’s-body-of-ev-
idence (S’s-evidence).7 Moreover, it seems that some passages 
from Williamson (2000) are hints towards, if not explicit 
commitments on this distinction.8 When we say things like, 
“the fact that photographs exist of ice on Mars is evidence for 
the hypothesis that there is water on Mars”, we use evidence 
in the evidence-for-h sense. Whereas when we advance that 
NASA has an impressive body of evidence, we are using 
evidence in the sense of S’s-evidence.9 Once the distinction 
is accepted, the proponent of (E=K) can claim that, while 
necessary truths can be S’s-evidence, they can never be evi-
dence-for-h. This enables a proponent of (E=K) to motivate 
the rejection of (FOE), while maintaining that it is possible to 
know necessary truths, and that evidence for a hypothesis is 
that which raises the probability of a hypothesis (EV). Such 
a move is not completely far-fetched, since we rarely (if ever) 
talk of necessary truths as evidence-for a hypothesis.10 What 
condition [e.g. the favouring condition of evidence for a hypothesis] in probabilistic terms: e should raise the probability of h” (Wil-
liamson, 2000, p. 186). And more straightforwardly: “Whether EV needs revision will be left open; the present aim is to investigate its 
constituent ‘S’s evidence includes e’” (Williamson, 2000, p. 189). To this I would like to reply that, first, it is not clear how one could revise 
EV in order to avoid the present problem while also maintaining the more general idea to which Williamson is committed, that only items 
that play a role in probabilistic reasoning can be part of one’s evidence. One may also consider adding to EV “P(h|e) > P(h) unless e is 
a necessary truth”. Adding this condition to EV on the mere basis of present problem seems somewhat ad hoc, however. What other 
theoretical motivation is there to exclude necessary truths from EV? Second, even if there is a theoretically satisfactory way to modify EV 
that avoids the above contradiction, then the present argument can be seen at least as another blow to the probability raising view of 
evidential support. My bet, however, is that in face of the above argument Williamson himself will prefer theoretical simplicity and stick 
to giving up (2). Thanks to Davide Fassio for bringing these possibilities to my attention.
6  Notice also that this specific problem is not a version of the well-known and much-discussed Old Evidence problem that raises a prob-
lem for most Bayesian accounts of conditionalization or updating on evidence. Without entering into more specific discussion of that 
problem, let me just point to the fact that the present problem does not appeal to conditionalization.
7 Timothy Williamson once suggested a similar thought to me in a personal communication.
8 For instance: “When is e evidence for the hypothesis h, for a subject S? Two conditions seem to be required. First, e should speak in 
favour of h. Second, e should have some kind of creditable standing” (Williamson, 2000, p. 186). Also: “That is why we need the second 
condition, that e should have a creditable standing. A natural idea is that S has a body of evidence, for use in the assessment of hypoth-
eses; that evidence should include e” (Williamson, 2000, p. 187). And, perhaps most straightforwardly: “EV concerns the evidence-for 
relation, as do most discussions of evidence. […] The focus of this chapter is elsewhere. It concerns the nature of the first relatum e of 
the evidence-for relation rather than its relation to the second relatum h. [T]he present aim is to investigate its [e.g. EV’s] constituent 
‘S’s evidence includes e’. Chapter 10 develops a theory of evidential probability to address the relation between evidence and what it 
supports” (Williamson, 2000, p. 189). In this last quote Williamson seems to say that Chapter 9 of his (2000), where he defends E=K, is 
about one’s evidence (S’s evidence), whereas Chapter 10 is about evidence-for-hypothesis.
9 One may, however, object that when we say that “NASA has evidence” we implicitly mean that NASA has evidence for some hypoth-
esis or another. In other words, this case, the objection goes, does not isolate a usage of “evidence” such that it can be understood 
without reference to a hypothesis, in which case one might question the possibility of evidence that doesn’t support a hypothesis. Pre-
sumably, the following example constitutes a better case of the use of evidence without appeal to hypotheses. You and a friend meet 
two scientists. The first gives you a book that contains reports of all the scientific experiments and observations that she has run during 
the last 20 years. The second gives your friend a book that contains reports of all the scientific experiments and observations that she 
has run during the last 20 years. The first book has about 2000 pages more than the second. Upon receiving the books and before 
opening them, indeed before learning anything about their content, you say to your friend: “My new evidence is certainly better than 
yours”. One may argue that in this case you haven’t used the concept of evidence-for-h, but merely a concept of evidence possession 
(this example is inspired by an example of reasons being pinned to chests of subjects given by Hawthorne and Magidor (forthcoming); 
they attribute this example in turn to Timothy Williamson). Now, on the other hand, while this example suggests that S’s-evidence need 
not always be evidence for a hypothesis, it also constitutes a further complication for a proponent of E=K. A proponent of E=K is now 
under pressure to explain what kind of possession is involved in this case, since, certainly, neither you nor your friend knows the relevant 
propositions involved in this example. In short, the evidence possession here cannot be the same sort of possession as the possession 
involved in the E=K thesis.
10 This may be contested, though. Perhaps referring to a posteriori necessary truths as evidence for a hypothesis is not so rare after all. 
That Baby Face Nelson is Lester Joseph Gillis is a necessary, yet a posteriori truth: it is true in all possible worlds, yet this truth can be 
the subject of a discovery—police officers may discover it, for instance, only after some investigation. Now, we can imagine that the fact 
that Baby Face Nelson is Lester Joseph Gillis is a crucial piece of evidence in the hypothesis of some criminal investigators that Lester 
Joseph Gillis robbed the bank in a situation where the investigators know that Baby Face Nelson robbed the bank. Examples of this sort 
may not be so rare after all. Thanks to Barbara Vetter for drawing my attention to this point.
Necessary truths, evidence, and knowledge
Filosofia Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 17(3): 302-307, sep/dec 2016 305
is more, theoretically  eaking, the gain in simplicity and in 
the ability to preserve probabilism, knowledge of necessary 
truths, and (EV) might, after all, be worth accepting the claim 
that known necessary truths are not evidence for any hypoth-
esis, despite their being evidence possessed by some subjects.
How the two concept solution 
undermines the central function 
argument for E=K
However, giving up (2), i.e. (FOE), is not as benign to 
(E=K) as one might think. That is, giving up (2) entails an 
important, until now unnoticed, dialectical cost for an (E=K) 
theorist. Namely, the rejection of (FOE) undermines a major 
argument in favour of (E=K). More  ecifically, if (FOE) does 
not hold, one cannot use the argument from the central func-
tions of our ordinary concept of evidence in favour of E=K.
As we have already noted, the argument from the central 
functions of our ordinary concept of evidence (the central func-
tion argument) has been put forward by Williamson as the 
main positive case in favour of (E=K) (2000, p. 193-207). The 
argument is a defence of the claim that only known propo-
sitions can serve the central functions of our ordinary con-
cept of evidence, and that, since only entities that can serve 
central functions of our ordinary concept of evidence can be 
evidence, one has to accept that only known propositions can 
be evidence. The central functions of our ordinary concept of 
evidence are supposed to be: to figure in inferences to the best 
explanation; to play a role in probabilistic reasoning/confir-
mation; and to enable one to rule out inconsistent hypothe-
ses. Williamson’s central function argument proceeds by two 
steps (not logically dependent, but merely dialectical), by first 
defending the view that only propositional items can serve 
the central functions of evidence, and then by defending the 
view that nothing less than known propositions could serve 
these functions.
Now, the problem is that the central function argument 
is supposed to support the claim about S’s evidence: that one’s 
evidence is all and only one’s knowledge. In order for it to be 
successful, it has to show that only known propositions can 
serve the central functions of our ordinary concept of S’s-ev-
idence. However, the functions that Williamson presents as 
the central functions of “our ordinary concept of evidence” 
are functions of the concept of evidence-for-h; these are not 
functions of the concept of S’s-evidence. Consider, for in-
stance, the function of playing a role in probabilistic reason-
ing. The playing of a role in probabilistic reasoning is a central 
function of the concept of evidence-for-h, i.e. the concept of 
evidence-for-a-hypothesis. It seems implausible that this is a 
central role of the concept of S’s-evidence. Williamson con-
siders probabilistic comparisons to be a paradigmatic form 
of probabilistic reasoning. Hence, he claims: “[o]ne way of 
using those probabilities is to regard h as more probable than 
h* given e (P(h|e) > P(h*|e)) if and only if h makes e more 
probable than h* does (P(e|h) > P(e|h*))” (2000, p. 196). 
Probabilistic comparison is central to our use of the concept 
of evidence-for-h. However, it is far from obvious that prob-
abilistic comparisons are central to our use of the concept 
of S’s-evidence. Indeed, it seems that the contrary holds. If 
there is any meaningful way of distinguishing between con-
cepts of evidence-for-h and S’s-evidence, then playing a role 
in probabilistic reasoning (e.g. in comparing hypotheses) is 
obviously one thing that should make a difference between 
the two concepts. Hence, the rejection of (FOE) and in-
troduction of the distinction between evidence-for-h and 
S’s-evidence have the consequence that, at best, the main, al-
legedly positive, argument in favour of (E=K) can only be an 
argument in favour of the claim (Evidence-for-h=K), which 
is not what the argument is intended to support. In other 
words, if one rejects (FOE) and accepts the distinction be-
tween evidence-for-h and S’s-evidence, then one of the main 
arguments in favour of the view that one’s evidence is consti-
tuted by all and only one’s knowledge is undermined.
Furthermore, notice that, some passages in Williamson 
(2000) might be read as saying that he is committed to the 
view that only items that can serve the central functions of 
evidence can be part of one’s evidence. He seems to press this 
point in a reply to the objection against (E=K) according to 
which some non-propositional items can be one’s evidence. 
See, for instance: “Although evidence may well have central 
functions additional to those considered above, genuine evi-
dence would make a difference to the serving of the functions 
considered above, whatever else it made a difference to” (Wil-
liamson, 2000, p. 197).
In short, if “genuine evidence” in the quoted passage 
means “genuine S’s-evidence”, then Williamson is commit-
ted to (FOE). However, if this is so, then there is a serious 
tension here, given his commitment to its negation (cf. his 
commitment to (E=K), (EV), probabilism, and (KNT)). 
Given such a tension, it seems that the most charitable 
reading of “genuine evidence” in the above quote should be 
one that takes it to mean “genuine evidence-for-h”. However, 
the trouble with this is that, if we accept this meaning, the 
argument from the central function of evidence does not 
support the view that S’s-evidence is knowledge (E=K), but 
merely that evidence-for-h is knowledge. In other words, the 
argument from the central functions of our ordinary con-
cept of evidence misses its target and fails to provide support 
for the  ecific claim that one’s evidence is all and only one’s 
propositional knowledge.
Conclusion and more 
general comments
Now, of course, this result does not undermine E=K. 
Indeed, in face of the argument from the knowledge of nec-
essary truths a proponent of E=K may well choose to avoid 
the inconsistency by endorsing the two evidence concepts 
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solution and maintain E=K on the basis of its simplicity and 
theoretical fruitfulness. One may think of E=K, probabilism, 
and EV as constituting a simple theoretical model that help 
us to advance in epistemology and illuminate complex issues 
and concepts.11 There is a good chance that E=K is the most 
simple and elegant account of evidence possession on the 
present-day philosophical market.
However, I hope that the above discussion has shown 
that it is unlikely that one can theoretically motivate such a 
model by appeal to arguments that substantially rely on the 
main functions of our ordinary concept of evidence. I have 
shown that Williamson’s argument that appeals to the ordi-
nary use of evidence in favour of E=K doesn’t support E=K, 
given his theoretical model. The moral that we might take 
from this result is that there is a tension in arguing about ev-
idence: either we can have a simple model of evidence (and 
evidential probability) based on E=K (and mathematics of 
probability) that has a great simplicity and exploratory power, 
or we can have an argument for E=K that is based on the use 
of an ordinary concept of evidence. It seems that we cannot 
have both. In this context then, not only does Williamson’s 
central function argument fail, but any similar argument will 
fail. The best and the only thing we can do to theoretically 
motivate E=K if we also want the power and the simplicity of 
probabilism and EV (without giving a lot away to sceptics) is 
to argue for E=K on the basis of merely methodological con-
siderations: it is the simplest and the most powerful model of 
evidence. This, however, is rather heterodox way of arguing 
for a view about evidence within contemporary mainstream 
epistemology. Most debates in mainstream epistemology, as 
far as I can see, crucially rely on (ordinary) intuitions about 
cases, not methodological arguments. Interestingly, this ob-
servation may help us to understand why Williamson’s E=K 
has attra ed such an impressive number of critics without 
ever, as far as I can see, being shown to be inconsistent.
Now, what should we think of E=K? Should we reject 
it on the basis of the numerous, apparently counter-intuitive 
consequences it has? At this point, I would like to suggest 
that the answer to this question will ultimately and surpris-
ingly depend on considerations about the methodology of 
epistemology. What kind of arguments do we want to be 
decisive in epistemology? Do we want to allow particular-
ities of cases to undermine powerful theoretical models or 
should we value simplicity and explanatory power above 
all? These are essential questions that have to be addressed 
before we can hope to make further substantial progress in 
theorizing about evidence and other epistemologically in-
teresting concepts.
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